This study explores the macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions in a two-country R&D-based growth model in which the market size of each country determines the incentives for innovation. We …nd that an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union leads to a decrease in employment in the domestic economy. This result has two important implications on innovation. First, it reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth. Second, it causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which in turn causes a negative e¤ect on domestic wages relative to foreign wages in the long run. We also derive welfare implications and calibrate our model to data in the US and the UK to quantify the e¤ects of labor unions on social welfare and wage inequality across countries. Our calibrated model is able to explain about half of the decrease in relative wage between the US and the UK from 1980 to 2007. Furthermore, the decrease in unions' bargaining power leads to quantitatively signi…cant welfare gains in the two countries.
Introduction
This study explores the macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions in an open-economy R&D-based growth model. We consider a two-country model in which a labor union bargains with employers over wages and employment in each country and the market size of each country determines the incentives for innovation. Within this growth-theoretic framework, we …nd that an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union leads to a decrease in employment in the domestic economy. In contrast, an increase in the bargaining power of an employment-oriented union leads to an increase in employment. Empirical studies 1 often …nd that increasing the degree of unionization has a negative e¤ect on employment, which is consistent with our result under a wageoriented union. This result has two important implications on innovation. First, by decreasing employment, an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth. This theoretical implication is consistent with empirical studies that …nd negative e¤ects of unions on innovation and growth. 2 Second, by decreasing employment and the market size of the domestic economy, an increase in the bargaining power of a wageoriented union causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which in turn causes a negative long-run e¤ect on domestic wages relative to foreign wages. In the long run, this negative e¤ect on relative wage income across countries would dominate the positive e¤ect of labor unions on wages if the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is su¢ciently large. We also derive welfare implications and discuss them in the main text.
To provide an illustrative numerical analysis, we calibrate our model to data in the US and the UK. We consider the cross-country e¤ects of labor unions between the US and the UK for the following reasons. We consider the US because it is the largest economy in the world. The largest trading partner of the US is the European Union. Within the European Union, the UK has a similar set of institutions that govern unionization and collective bargaining as the US. As Card et al. (2004) point out, " [a] s with other aspects of the economy, collective bargaining institutions in these countries are broadly similar... Thus it is possible to compare the structure of wages for workers whose wages are set by union contracts... A similar task is far more di¢cult in other countries including the major European countries...". Figure 1a plots the HP-…lter trends of labor income share of GDP from 1980 to 2007 in the US and the UK. 3 This …gure shows a well-documented stylized fact that the labor share of income has gradually declined since the early 1980's. Figure 1b plots the HP-…lter trends of unemployment rates in the two countries. 4 This …gure shows that unemployment has also gradually declined in these two countries until 2007. 5 We calibrate our model to compute the degree of unions' wage orientation and the decrease in workers' bargaining power that enable the model to replicate this simultaneous decrease in labor income share and unemployment in the two countries. We …nd that the degree of unions' wage orientation must be stronger in the UK than in the US in order for the calibrated economies to match the data. We also explore the quantitative implications on social welfare and wage inequality across the two countries. Our calibrated model is able to explain about half of the decrease in relative wage between the US and the UK from 1980 to 2007. Furthermore, we …nd that both countries gain from the decrease in unions' bargaining power, but the welfare improvement in the UK is greater than that in the US due to changes in relative wage income. Speci…cally, the welfare gains are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 5.2% in the US and 8.1% in the UK.
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This study relates to the literature on labor unions. Early studies in this literature focus on the formulation of labor unions' objective function; see for example Oswald (1985) for a survey. We follow a common approach in the literature to specify a Stone-Geary union objective function over wages and employment. Pemberton (1988) provides a microeconomic foundation for this union objective function as "the outcome of an internal bargain between the leadership and membership" in a managerial union. Our study relates most closely to a recent branch of this literature that explores the e¤ects of labor unions on innovation and economic growth. Palokangas (1996) is the seminal study in this branch of the literature. Subsequent studies, such as Palokangas (2000 Palokangas ( , 2004 Palokangas ( , 2005 , Boone (2000) and Ji et al. (2015) , also analyze the e¤ects of labor unions in R&D-based growth models. 6 Palokangas (1996 Palokangas ( , 2000 Palokangas ( , 2004 Palokangas ( , 2005 …nds that increasing the bargaining power of labor union serves to increase economic growth, whereas Boone (2000) …nds that labor union dampens economic growth. Ji et al. (2015) …nd that labor union has both a negative growth e¤ect via unemployment and a positive growth e¤ect via endogenous market structure, and these two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other leaving an overall neutral e¤ect on growth. Our theoretical model is able to replicate (via an alternative mechanism) the above results that increasing the bargaining power of labor unions can have a positive e¤ect on growth and innovation (under an employment-oriented union), a negative e¤ect on growth and innovation (under a wage-oriented union) and a neutral e¤ect on growth and innovation (when the union is neither wage nor employment oriented). 7 In addition to analyzing the e¤ects of labor unions on the level of innovation 6 See also Peretto (2011) who explores the interaction between the market power of unions in the labor market and the market power of …rms in the product market. 7 Chang et al. (2007) also …nd that unions' wage orientation determines the e¤ects of their bargaining power on economic growth, but they consider an AK-type growth model in which economic growth is driven by capital within an economy as is common in the literature, 8 our study also explores the e¤ects of labor unions on the direction of innovation and wage inequality across countries, complementing the abovementioned studies in the literature.
An interesting study by considers the relationship between labor unions and the direction of innovation across sectors within a country. They analyze the endogenous formation of labor unions but take innovation as an exogenous change in productivity parameters, whereas our study provides a complementary analysis by taking the existence of labor unions as given and exploring their e¤ects on the direction of innovation across countries, instead of sectors. This open-economy analysis allows us to explore the cross-country welfare e¤ects of unions and also how the relative market size of countries a¤ects the allocation of R&D resources across countries. In a standard model of directed technical change, 9 the market size of a sector is measured by the amount of labor in the sector. Similarly, the market size of a country is measured by the level of employment in the country. The presence of labor unions a¤ects employment in the two countries, which in turn a¤ects the amount of pro…ts generated by intermediate goods. Consequently, labor unions have an e¤ect on the value of inventions and hence the allocation of R&D resources across countries.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 provides analytical results. Section 4 conducts a quantitative analysis. The …nal section concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The model
In this section, we consider an open-economy version of the R&D-based growth model originated from the seminal study by Romer (1990) . 10 In the model, there are two countries: Home and Foreign. Final goods are produced by combining intermediate goods from the two countries via a standard CES Armington aggregator. Intermediate goods in each country are produced using domestic labor and di¤erentiated monopolistic inputs. The number of varieties of these di¤erentiated inputs increases over time as a result of R&D. In each country, there is a representative labor union that bargains with a representative federation of employers to determine wage and employment, which in turn determines the market size of each country. As a result, changes in employment in a country potentially a¤ect the direction of innovation across countries. It is useful to note that although a change in employment would also a¤ect the level of technology in a closed-economy model, the presence of international trade in our open-economy model allows R&D resources (in the form of …nal goods) to move across countries. As a result, relative employment in the two countries a¤ects the allocation of R&D resources and the direction of innovation across countries. accumulation. Our study complements their interesting analysis by exploring the e¤ects of labor unions in an open-economy R&D-based growth model. 8 An exception is Palokangas (2005) , who explores an open economy with unions and international R&D spillovers; however, he does not consider the direction of innovation and wage inequality across countries. 9 See for example Acemoglu (1998 Acemoglu ( , 2002 
Household
In the Home country h, there is a representative household, which has the following lifetime utility function:
where c h t denotes consumption of …nal goods at time t, and > 0 is the subjective discount rate. The household maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation: 
There are analogous conditions and variables with a superscript f in the Foreign country. 15 
Final goods
Final goods are homogeneous across countries, and their production is perfectly competitive. We also assume that they are freely traded across countries. 16 Final goods are produced with the 11 We also impose the usual no-Ponzi-game condition that requires the household's lifetime budget constraint to be satis…ed. 12 r t is not indexed by a country superscript because we consider a global …nancial market. Our derivations are robust to any distribution of …nancial assets across the two countries. In other words, we do not impose any restriction on which country owns more (or even all) of the monopolistic …rms and whether there is any foreign bond holding between the two countries. The distribution of …nancial assets across countries a¤ects the relative level of consumption across countries, but not the steady-state equilibrium levels of other variables. The households' budget constraints ensure the balance of payments. One special case is that all domestic (foreign) …rms are owned by the domestic (foreign) household and that there is zero foreign bond holding. Only when we examine welfare implications, we focus on this special case to pin down the levels of consumption in the two countries. 13 In this simple model, unemployment is caused by the union. In the absence of the union, all labor L h will be employed by …rms.
14 Also, the transversality condition requires r t > _ a h t =a h t , which holds on the balanced growth path given the log utility function and > 0. 15 The Euler equations of the two countries show that the assumption of a global …nancial market (i.e., a common real interest rate in the two countries) gives rise to the same growth rate of consumption across countries, which in turn implies that the steady-state growth rate of output and technology would also be the same across countries. 16 As a result, we do not impose any restriction on the location of the production of …nal goods. Suppose all …nal goods are produced in the Foreign (Home) country. Then, the Home (Foreign) country would import …nal goods and export intermediate goods.
following CES Armington aggregator:
where X 
where l h t is the employment of labor and
We also impose the following parameter restrictions: ; 2 (0; 1) and + < 1. Here we follow previous studies on unions and bargaining such as Palokangas (1996 Palokangas ( , 2005 , Chang et al. (2007) , Chang and Hung (2015) and Ji et al. (2015) to assume decreasing returns to scale, 18 allowing the …rms to have positive pro…t in order to facilitate the bargaining process between the employers' federation and the labor union. 19 The pro…t function of the representative …rm is
where
Departing from models without labor union, we follow previous studies to consider a representative labor union that bargains with a representative federation of employers to determine wage w h t and employment l h t . For simplicity, we consider a closed shop union under which only union members are eligible for employment. As in Pemberton (1988) and Chang et al. (2007) , we consider a managerial union whose objective is in ‡uenced by the union leaders' desire for a larger membership and the members' desire for a higher wage. Formally, the union's objective is given by a standard Stone-Geary function:
The parameter ! h > 0 measures the weight that the union places on workers' incremental wage income from employment (i.e., wage minus unemployment bene…t). The parameter h > 0 measures the weight that the union places on membership. For simplicity, we normalize h to unity and use ! h to measure the weight that the union places on wage relative to membership; i.e., we focus on h = 1 for the rest of the analysis. 21 When
, we refer to the union as being wage-oriented (employment-oriented).
The employers' federation and the labor union bargain over w
There are analogous conditions for w f t and l f t in the Foreign country. 20 Here we follow Chang et al. (2007) to assume that the union objective function depends only on current wages and employment. This simplifying assumption allows for a tractable analysis of transition dynamics. 21 Our results are robust to h > 0 (derivations available upon request), but some of the expressions become more complicated in this case. 22 In this study, we focus on e¢cient bargaining. In the case of right-to-manage bargaining (under which the union and employers bargain over wages only), equilibrium employment and economic growth are unambiguously decreasing in the union's bargaining power, contradicting evidence from some empirical studies (discussed in footnote 2). Derivations are available upon request.
Di¤erentiated inputs
In each country, there is a continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated inputs i 2 [0; N h
R&D
The invention of a new variety of di¤erentiated inputs for the Home country requires h units of …nal goods. Similarly, the invention of a new variety of di¤erentiated inputs for the Foreign country requires f units of …nal goods. In other words, we consider the lab-equipment R&D speci…cation as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) . 23 In particular, the innovation process of new varieties for the Home country is given by
where R h t is the amount of …nal goods devoted to creating new varieties for the Home country. 24 Suppose we denote v h t as the value of an invention in the Home country. Free entry in the R&D sector implies
The familiar Bellman equation is
Intuitively, the Bellman equation equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset, where the asset return is the monopolistic pro…t h t plus any potential capital gain _ v h t . There are analogous conditions for v f t in the Foreign country. 23 In Section 2.8, we will discuss the implications under an alternative R&D speci…cation. 24 It is useful to note that we do not impose any restriction on the location of R&D. An inventor in either country may create a new variety for the Home country with productivity 1= h or for the Foreign country with productivity 1= f .
Government
In each country, there is a government that determines unemployment bene…t and levies a lumpsum tax on the household to balance the …scal budget. The balanced-budget condition in the Home country is the government in the Home country balances its …scal budget given by
the government in the Foreign country balances its …scal budget given by
Equilibrium employment
Here we …rst derive the equilibrium levels of employment in the two countries. Substituting (8) and (10) into (9) yields the pro…t function of intermediate goods in the Home country given by
Substituting (22) into the bargaining solution in (14) yields
where employment l h is decreasing in the union's wage orientation ! h and is ambiguous with respect to its bargaining power h depending on the value of ! h . We impose parameter restrictions to ensure l h t 2 (0; L h ). By analogous inference, the equilibrium level of employment in the Foreign country is given by
We also impose parameter restrictions to ensure l f t 2 (0; L f ). Equations (25) and (26) give the equilibrium levels of employment fl h ; l f g regardless of whether the economy is on or o¤ the balanced growth path.
Relative wage and relative technologies across countries
We now derive the relative wage across countries. Combining (6) and (7) yields the relative demand function for intermediate goods given by
Substituting (16) into (8) yields the production of intermediate goods X h t given by
Substituting (28) and the analogous condition for X f t into (27) yields
which determines the relative price of X h t and X f t . Substituting (16) into (23) yields the equilibrium wage rate in the Home country given by
Combining (30) and the analogous expression for w f t yields an expression for the relative wage across countries. If we substitute the relative price in (29) into this expression, we would obtain the equilibrium relative wage given by
which is decreasing in relative employment l h =l f but increasing in relative technology N Proof. See Appendix A.
Next we derive the steady-state equilibrium value of N h t =N f t . In the long run, innovation takes place in both countries; therefore, we have v (20), we obtain the equilibrium value of an invention in the Home country given by
where the second equality follows from (17) . Combining (32) with the analogous expression for v f , we obtain the relative value of inventions across countries given by
where the second equality follows from v h = h and v f = f . Combining (29) and (33) 
which is increasing in relative employment l h =l f capturing the market-size e¤ect on the direction of innovation across countries. Intuitively, a higher level of employment in the Home country increases both the amount of pro…ts generated by intermediate goods and the value of inventions in the country. As a result, more inventions are created for this country. Lemma Proof. Use (34) and recall that " > 1.
Finally, we substitute (34) into (31) to derive the steady-state equilibrium relative wage.
Equation (35) shows that the steady-state value of w h t =w f t is increasing in relative employment l h =l f if and only if the substitution elasticity " is greater than (1 + )= .
Economic growth and social welfare
In Lemma 2, we derive the steady-state equilibrium growth rate, which is monotonically increasing in the equilibrium levels of employment fl h ; l f g. 26 The implied negative relationship between unemployment and growth is consistent with the empirical evidence in Gordon (1997) and Brauninger 25 Although our model features the scale e¤ect as we will show in the next section, this result would continue to hold in a scale-invariant semi-endogenous-growth version of the model. In other words, the direction of innovation across countries will continue to depend on the relative market size of the two countries because the market-size e¤ect requires only the level of technology (but not the growth rate of technology) to depend on the size of the domestic market. 26 This is known as the scale e¤ect in the literature. In a scale-invariant semi-endogenous-growth version of the model, an increase in employment would still lead to a higher growth rate in the short run (i.e., before the economy reaches the new balanced growth path).
and Pannenberg (2002), who …nd that higher unemployment reduces growth. Therefore, whenever labor unions decrease employment, they also decrease economic growth. 27 Lemma 2 The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of consumption is given by g = (1 )
. (36) Proof. See Appendix A.
Using (1), we can express the representative household's lifetime welfare on the balanced growth path as
where j 2 fh; f g and we have de…ned t = 0 as the time when the economy reaches the balanced growth path. All the previous derivations are robust to the distribution of assets across countries; however, to derive the level of consumption in each country, we now need to make an additional assumption on the cross-country distribution of assets (i.e., the equity shares of monopolistic …rms in the two countries). Following the standard treatment in the literature, 28 we assume home bias in asset holding under which domestic (foreign) …rms are owned by the domestic (foreign) household. Furthermore, we assume zero foreign bond holding. Under these assumptions, we derive the following expression for ln c j 0 and U j in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Under home bias in asset holding, the steady-state welfare function is given by
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (38) shows that welfare U j is increasing in the equilibrium growth rate g, which is given by (36) , and in the balanced-growth level of technology N j 0 , which is determined by (34) . In this model, when the economy is on a transition path, new varieties are created only for one country until the economy reaches the new balanced growth path along which N 27 If we consider an alternative innovation process in which labor is the factor input for R&D, then the relationship between employment and economic growth could be di¤erent. For example, decreasing employment in the production sector may lead to an increase in R&D employment and growth. Therefore, the lab-equipment innovation process in this study seems to be more consistent with empirical evidence on employment and growth in e.g., Gordon (1997) and Brauninger and Pannenberg (2002) . Furthermore, although the lab-equipment innovation process ignores intertemporal knowledge spillovers on R&D, the expanding varieties of intermediate goods improve labor productivity and increase the wage rate of labor as shown in (30) . 28 See for example Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) .
Macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions
In this section, we explore the macroeconomic implications of labor unions. In particular, we are interested in the e¤ects of a labor union becoming more wage oriented (i.e., ! h increases) and having more bargaining power relative to employers (i.e., h increases). In Section 3.1, we analyze the e¤ects of increasing ! h . 29 In Section 3.2, we analyze the e¤ects of increasing h .
Wage orientation of labor unions
Equation (25) shows that an increase in the union's wage orientation ! h leads to a decrease in employment l h in the Home country. Intuitively, as the union in the Home country becomes more wage oriented, it demands a higher wage and depresses labor demand. Given that employment l f in the Foreign country is independent of ! h , an increase in ! h leads to a decrease in relative employment l h =l f , which in turn increases relative wage w h t =w f t across countries in the short run (i.e., for a given N h t =N f Proposition 2 As the labor union becomes more wage oriented, employment in the domestic economy decreases. This decrease in employment increases the wage rate in the domestic economy relative to the foreign economy in the short run. In the long run, the decrease in employment in the domestic economy causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which causes a negative e¤ect on the relative wage. The overall e¤ect on the relative wage in the long run is negative if and only if the substitution elasticity " is greater than a threshold given by (1 + )= . Finally, the e¤ects on the steady-state growth rate and domestic welfare are negative.
Proof. See Appendix A. 29 The e¤ects of increasing unemployment bene…t b h are the same as increasing ! h . Figure 2 
Bargaining power of labor unions
In this subsection, we …rst consider the case of a wage-oriented union (i.e., ! h > 1). Equation (25) shows that an increase in the union's bargaining power h leads to a decrease in employment l h if and only if the union is wage oriented. This decrease in employment l h has a positive e¤ect on the wage rate in the Home country as shown in (30) . Furthermore, an increase in the union's bargaining power increases the share of output that goes to wage income as shown in (23) . These two positive e¤ects on w 
The transitional path of w h t =w f t in response to an increase in ! h is similar to Figure 2 , except that the threshold of " is now given by " instead of (1 + )= . Lemma 2 shows that the decrease in employment also reduces economic growth in the long run. Together with the decrease in N h t =N f t , steady-state welfare in the Home country decreases, but the welfare e¤ect in the Foreign country is ambiguous due to the opposing e¤ects of g and N f 0 on U f in (38) . We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 When a wage-oriented union has more bargaining power, employment in the domestic economy decreases. This decrease in employment increases the wage rate in the domestic economy relative to the foreign economy in the short run. In the long run, the decrease in employment in the domestic economy causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which causes a negative e¤ect on the relative wage. The overall long-run e¤ect of increasing a wageoriented union's bargaining power on the relative wage is negative if and only if the substitution elasticity " is greater than a threshold given by ". Finally, the e¤ects on the steady-state growth rate and domestic welfare are negative.
Quantitative analysis
To illustrate how large an e¤ect labor unions could have on the macroeconomy, we calibrate our stylized model to data in the US and the UK to see if it can replicate the simultaneous decrease in labor income share and unemployment from 1980 to 2007. An assumption we make is that the economy is at an initial steady state in 1980 and converges to a new steady state in 2007. Therefore, we consider the long-run trend values of labor income share and unemployment as in Figure 1 . Furthermore, we assume that the decrease in labor income share is due to a decrease in workers' bargaining power f h ; f g. 31 However, it is useful to note that we do not rule out other fundamental reasons for the decrease in labor income share; for example, globalization may reduce the bargaining power of workers, which in turn decreases labor income share. Given the change in workers' bargaining power f h ; f g, we compute the implied values of the unions' wage orientation f! h ; ! f g that enable the model to deliver the observed decrease in the unemployment rates in the two countries. Given that our goal is to examine the e¤ects of unions' bargain power, we hold other structural parameters constant when performing this numerical experiment. Finally, we also explore the quantitative implications on social welfare and wage inequality across the two countries.
The model features the following parameters f ; "; ; ; (8), we set the degree of labor intensity to 0.5 and the intensity of intermediate goods to 0.2. It is useful to recall that labor income share is given by + h (1 ) in the model. Therefore, is the lower bound of labor income share, and 1 is the upper bound. Given that labor income share has fallen to as low as 0.54 in the US in recent years, we consider labor income share bounded between 0.5 and 0.8 to be reasonable. As for the share parameter in the …nal-goods production function (4), we calibrate it using the relative wage of the two countries, and w h t =w f t is 1.45 in 1980. 32 As for the R&D productivity parameters f h ; f g, it can be shown that one of these parameters can be set as a free parameter without changing the results. 33 Therefore, we normalize f to one and calibrate h using the long-run average growth rate in the two economies for which g is about 2%. We normalize L f to one and calibrate L h by matching the relative size of labor force in the 31 For example, Kristal (2013) uses industry-level data to show that the decrease in labor income share in the US since the early 1980's is due to the decrease in unionization and workers' bargaining power; see also Kristal (2010) and Judzik and Sala (2013) for evidence based on country-level data from a sample of countries including the UK and the US. 32 Data source: Penn World Table, and OECD Annual Indicators on Unit Labour Costs. From the Penn World Table, we obtain PPP-adjusted real income per worker. Then, we use OECD data on labor income share to compute real wage income per worker in the two countries. 33 It can be shown that it is the ratio
" that a¤ects the quantitative results. Given a value of , the individual values of f h ; f ; g do not matter; therefore, one of these parameters can be treated as a free parameter. Furthermore, the calibrated parameter values in Table 1 shows that labor income shares in the US and the UK were about the same at 0.66 in 1980. By 2007, labor income share in the US falls to 0.55, whereas labor income share in the UK decreases only slightly to 0.63. Our model provides the following structural interpretation of this empirical pattern: the bargaining power of workers falls by a much larger degree in the US than in the UK, as indicated in Table 1 . The calibrated value of h = 0:17 being smaller than the calibrated value of f = 0:43 is consistent with the casual observation that unions in the US are less powerful than those in the UK; for example, the union density of 11.6% in the US is lower than that of 27.9% in the UK in 2007. 36 Figure 1b shows that unemployment rates in the two countries fall to a similar value of 5%. The fact that unemployment decreases in response to a decrease in the bargaining power of workers implies that unions are wage-oriented (i.e., f! h ; ! f g > 1). 37 Furthermore, the degree of wage orientation must be larger in the UK in order for its unemployment rate to fall by a larger magnitude despite the smaller decrease in its workers' bargaining power. Table 1 shows that the degree of wage orientation ! f in the UK is 1.71, which is larger than ! h = 1:14 in the US. Under these values of f! h ; ! f g, decreasing workers' bargaining power h from 0.53 to 0.17 causes the unemployment rate to decrease from 8% to 5% in the US, whereas decreasing f from 0.53 to 0.43 causes the unemployment rate to decrease from 10% to 5% in the UK.
In the rest of this section, we simulate the long-run e¤ects of decreasing workers' bargaining power f h ; f g on relative wage in (35) and welfare in (38) while holding other parameter values constant. We consider the calibrated parameter values and changes in f h ; f g in Table 1 . The decrease in workers' bargaining power f h ; f g leads to an increase in employment fl h ; l f g, which in turn increases the long-run growth rate from 2% to 2.16%. 38 This positive growth e¤ect bene…ts 34 Data source: World Development Indicators, and Federal Reserve Economic Data. 35 Our model features exogenous labor-force participation in the two countries. In the data, the labor-force participation rates increase from the early 1980's to 2007 by about two and four percentage points in the US and the UK respectively. This larger increase in the labor-force participation rate in the UK should reinforce its larger decrease in the unemployment rate. However, our model takes the labor force as given and does not shed any light on whether the changes in labor-force participation are caused by labor unions. Therefore, we focus on changes in unemployment which is determined by the bargaining power of labor unions in our analysis. 36 Data source: OECD Trade Union Statistics. 37 In the case of employment-oriented unions, decreasing their bargaining power would lead to lower employment and higher unemployment. 38 For example, Carmeci and Mauro (2003) estimate dynamic panel regressions using data on OECD countries and …nd that decreasing labor union density indeed has a positive e¤ect on long-run growth. the two countries equally. However, the larger reduction in unemployment in the UK than that 
Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions in an open-economy R&D-based growth model. We …nd that the e¤ects of labor unions on employment, innovation and economic growth are theoretically ambiguous and depend on their wage orientation. In the case of the US and the UK, wage-oriented unions seem to …t the data better by enabling the model to replicate the observed decrease in labor income share, unemployment and relative wage across countries. In this case, decreasing the bargaining power of unions stimulates employment and economic growth, as some empirical studies (discussed in the introduction) tend to …nd. However, when it comes to employment-oriented unions, increasing their bargaining power would raise employment and growth. These theoretical …ndings suggest that there is no one-size-…ts-all policy when it comes to reforming existing labor-market institutions, such as labor unions. Therefore, policymakers should make an e¤ort to understand the country-speci…c or even industry-speci…c e¤ects of labor unions. Furthermore, to ensure analytical tractability, we have kept our model as simple as possible and neglected many realistic features of the labor market. Hence, it would be useful to structurally estimate the e¤ects of labor unions and workers' bargaining power using a more realistic model, and we leave this interesting extension to future research. 
Here it holds that 
where the …rst equality comes from (A3) with P
